Thesis Evasión en el transporte público: el problema del pasajero evasor.
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Date
2021-11
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Program
Ingeniería Civil Industrial
Departament
Campus
Campus Santiago Vitacura
Abstract
El presente trabajo trata el tema de la evasión en el transporte público, al presentarse pasajeros que, pudiendo pagar la tarifa o ticket, deciden no realizarlo por diversas causas, pudiendo ser socioeconómicas, demográficas e incluso ideológicas. Dichos pasajeros son conocidos como oportunistas.
El primer método para tratar de inhibir estas situaciones consiste en aplicar métodos de control de pago más rígidos, pero que van en contra de la eficiencia del sistema, debiendo emplear métodos de pago que facilitan el acceso pero que reducen el control del pago efectivo del ticket o tarifa.
Chile no está exento de estas situaciones, siendo incluso uno de los países que tiene la mayor tasa de evasión, debido a la implementación del sistema de Transporte Transantiago (Actualmete denominado RED) en el año 2007. Lo anterior condicionado a la mala calidad de servicio, junto con un sistema del tipo "Proof of Payment"sin barreras (POPS ) que facilita la evasión.
Existen muchos métodos para combatir la evasión, no obstante, ciertos patrones van presentándose en todos los países, como aplicación de multas e imponer probabilidades de inspección en la red de transporte, buscando desincentivar la decisión de realizarla. Estos pueden ser incorporados en un modelo matemático que sea capaz de proponer las mejores probabilidades de inspección y valores de multa; esto a nivel de la entidad fiscalizadora.
Dentro del modelo anterior, el pasajero debe ser capaz de buscar su mejor ruta para lograr la mayor eficiencia considerando costos y tiempos de viaje, asumiendo que se comporta de manera racional, pudiendo cambiar sus decisiones frente a las condiciones que la autoridad imponga en la red de transporte.
La principal contribución de la presente tesis, busca por una parte, entregar una revisión de la literatura acerca de la evasión en el transporte público, y por otra proponer un modelo matemático que sea capaz de representar el comportamiento del pasajero oportunista. Lo anterior permitirá a las autoridades insertarlo en un problema de dos niveles, para ser resuelto con herramientas matemáticas que entreguen directrices y acciones claras para buscar inhibir la evasión en cualquier sistema de transporte en el que sea implementado.
This work deals with the issue of evasion in public transport, when passengers appear who, being able to pay the fare or ticket, decide not to do it for various reasons, which may be socioeconomic, demographic and even ideological. Such passengers are known as opportunists. The first method to try to inhibit these situations is to apply more rigid payment control methods, which go against the e_ciency of the system, having to use payment methods that facilitate access but reduce the control of the e_ective payment of the ticket. Chile is not exempt from these situations, being even one of the countries that has the highest evasion rate, due to the implementation of the Transantiago Transportation system (currently called RED) in 2007. This is conditioned to the poor quality of service , together with a system of the type "Proof of Payment"without barriers (POPS ) that facilitates evasion. There are many methods to combat evasion, however, certain patterns are appearing in all countries, such as the application of fines and imposing probabilities of inspection in the transport network, seeking to discourage the decision to carry it out. These can be incorporated into a mathematical model that is capable of proposing the best inspection probabilities and fine values; this at the level of the supervisory entity. Within the previous model, the passenger must be able to find their best route to achieve greater e_ciency considering costs and travel times, assuming that they behave in a rational way, being able to change their decisions in the face of the conditions imposed by the authority on the network Of transport. The main contribution of this thesis seeks, on the one hand, to provide a review of the literature about evasion in public transport, and on the other to propose a mathematical model that is capable of representing the behavior of the opportunistic passenger. The foregoing will allow the authorities to insert it into a two-level problem, to be solved with mathematical tools that provide clear guidelines and actions to seek to inhibit evasion in any transportation system in which it is implemented.
This work deals with the issue of evasion in public transport, when passengers appear who, being able to pay the fare or ticket, decide not to do it for various reasons, which may be socioeconomic, demographic and even ideological. Such passengers are known as opportunists. The first method to try to inhibit these situations is to apply more rigid payment control methods, which go against the e_ciency of the system, having to use payment methods that facilitate access but reduce the control of the e_ective payment of the ticket. Chile is not exempt from these situations, being even one of the countries that has the highest evasion rate, due to the implementation of the Transantiago Transportation system (currently called RED) in 2007. This is conditioned to the poor quality of service , together with a system of the type "Proof of Payment"without barriers (POPS ) that facilitates evasion. There are many methods to combat evasion, however, certain patterns are appearing in all countries, such as the application of fines and imposing probabilities of inspection in the transport network, seeking to discourage the decision to carry it out. These can be incorporated into a mathematical model that is capable of proposing the best inspection probabilities and fine values; this at the level of the supervisory entity. Within the previous model, the passenger must be able to find their best route to achieve greater e_ciency considering costs and travel times, assuming that they behave in a rational way, being able to change their decisions in the face of the conditions imposed by the authority on the network Of transport. The main contribution of this thesis seeks, on the one hand, to provide a review of the literature about evasion in public transport, and on the other to propose a mathematical model that is capable of representing the behavior of the opportunistic passenger. The foregoing will allow the authorities to insert it into a two-level problem, to be solved with mathematical tools that provide clear guidelines and actions to seek to inhibit evasion in any transportation system in which it is implemented.
Description
Keywords
Teoría de juegos, Bi-level, Evasión tarifaria, Pago transporte público, Toma de decisiones